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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature ofthe Case.

This is a case of a failed business relationship between a former Eagle developer and a
Boise restauranteur. The sole owner and managing member of Plaintiff Mosell Equities, LLC,
("Mosell Equities" or "Plaintiff'), Glenn E. Mosell ("Mosell"), was the developer of a proposed
development near Sunnyslope in Canyon County, Idaho, to be known as "Polo Cove" (Tr., Vol. I,
p. 160, L. 21). In the summer of 2005, Mosell approached John Berryhill ("Mr. Berryhill"), sole
shareholder and president of Berryhill & Company, Inc., about opening a restaurant within the
development. Mosell Equities then began paying Mr. Berryhill as a consultant on the Polo Cove
development. Ultimately, however, Mosell discussed a different relationship between them,
which would allow Mr. Berryhill to participate in Polo Cove profits beyond daily restaurant
operations. The parties agreed to "blend" certain of their activities and form a new entity called
MoBerry Ventures or similar names. Berryhill & Company would contribute its name, restaurant
operations and expertise and Mosell Equities would contribute cash to buy into the new
combined entity.
Corporate documents for a MoBerry entity went through some drafts with attorneys, but
were never finalized or executed. Nevertheless, on approximately June 28, 2007, Mosell
Equities made its first cash contribution. In a handwritten note on a copy of the check, which is
signed by John Berryhill and Glenn Mosell (referred to as Exhibit 1), there appears the following:
This is a loan from Mosell Equities to cover some misc. downtown expenses
during our bookeeper [sic] transition. It will go into the general check register &
be used for any billing of payables needed for downtown or Berryhill & Co. l!
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will be transitioned into part of Glenn's "buy in" of Moberry Venture Corp. Inc.
(emphasis added)
Subsequently, Mosell Equities made further contributions by check, some of which
referenced the term "loan" and some of which did not. When Mr. Berryhill asked Mosell about
the reference to a "loan," Mosell responded: "we have to call it something." Moselliater
acknowledged that the "loan" was only an "interim substitute." The bulk of Mosell Equities'
cash contribution went to tenant improvements at a new downtown Boise restaurant location,
plus a later, large expansion at the same location, including a "Polo Cove" showroom.
Mosell ultimately abandoned the Polo Cove development. Mosell Equities then brought
this action based on several legal theories premised on the fact that there was a simple loan
transaction between the parties, nothing more. The jury found for Defendant Berryhill &
Company on all these theories, including breach of contract, breach of an implied-in-fact contract
and unjust enrichment. l Later, the trial court2 granted Plaintiff's motion for JNOV on one
element of the express contract claim, believing it should have instructed the jury that Exhibit 1
constituted a contract, but it would be up to a second jury to determine what the parties intended
by it. As pointed out below, a second trial is a costly and unnecessary exercise.
B.

The Course of the Proceedings.
1.

Complaint filed May 28, 2009.

The jury found for Plaintiff on a count for conversion regarding a very small
amount offumiture and awarded $2,016.85. The jury also found for Defendant John E. Berryhill
individually on a fraud-in-the-inducement claim.
The original judge on the case was the Honorable Darla S. Williamson ("the
district court"). Subsequently, the Honorable Dennis E. Goff presided over the trial and post-trial
motions ("the trial court").
2
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C.

2.

Amended Complaint filed September 14,2009.

3.

Motion to Dismiss granted on Count Six of Amended Complaint on
December 4, 2009 (corporate veil piercing) (no claim left against
Defendant Amy Berryhill).

4.

Jury Verdict on September 15,2010, finding for Defendant Berryhill &
Company on all counts except conversion; finding for Defendant John E.
Berryhill on the fraud-in-the-inducement count).

5.

Hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for JNOV on October 7, 2010. (JNOV
granted on issue of contract formation, necessitating new trial on
remaining elements of breach of express contract claim, according to the
trial court). Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for JNOV filed October 26,
2010, and related Order of Clarification filed November 23,2010.
Judgment filed January 10,2011.

6.

Appeal filed on December 6, 2010.

Statement of Facts.

This case arises from a failed business relationship. The sole owner and managing
member of Plaintiff Mosell Equities, Glenn E. Mosell, was the developer of a proposed
development near Sunnyslope in Canyon County, Idaho, to be known as "Polo Cove." Mosell
testified:
There was a vineyard for sale around 2004 and 2005 that was listed, it was on the
market, and a realtor show - took me out there, showed it to me. And it's in the
Sunnyslope area of Canyon County. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 159, L. 9)
So - I assembled a few pieces. And they referred to 290 acres or 300 acres was the
original block. And I was looking to probably sub-divide it into five-acre little
gentleman farms, little vineyards, and sub-divide and sell five-acre parcels. After
a little while .. , we decided to maybe propose a winery, or a wine country
restaurant at that site. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 160, L. 21)
Mosell had experience in the development field. He grew up in Southern California and
graduated from UC San Diego in the early 1980s (Tr., Vol. I, p. 158, L. 9). He was an economics

APPELLANT'S BRIEF, P. 3

major and ultimately obtained his Series 6 license, working as an investment broker (Tr., Vol. I,
p. 328, L. 1). Mosell moved to Boulder, Colorado, and started a development called Mill
Village. Eventually, Mosell and his partner had a "difference of opinion in vision" and Mosell
was bought out prior to any construction having begun (Tr., Vol. I, p. 328, L. 24).
Mosell subsequently pursued a development in San Marcos that he ultimately walked
away from and nothing was built (Tr., Vol. I, p. 332, L. 2). In Fredericksburg, Texas, Mosell put
some land under contract intending to develop it and then decided not to go forward (Tr., Vol. I,
p. 332, L. 13). After moving to Idaho in 2000, Mosell became involved in a development known
as Iron Horse in Cascade where disagreements arose and that development ended, nothing having
been built (Tr., Vol. I, p. 334, L. 6).
In July of2005, Mosell approached the owner and President of Defendant Berryhill &
Company, John Berryhill, initially about building a restaurant within the Polo Cove development
(Tr., Vol. I, p. 160, L. 21). Regarding the evolution of his relationship with Mr. Berryhill relative
to his restaurant and Polo Cove, Mosell testified:
I just called and left a message, introduced myself as a developer, asking ifhe was
interested in building a wine country restaurant, and just left a message. (Tr., Vol.
I, p. 160, L. 25)
I recognized that he [Mr. Berryhill] was a local chef with a following. (Tr., Vol. I,
p. 161, L. 20). For Boise, he's fairly well-known. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 161, L. 24)
He [Mr. Berryhill] expressed interest in being a part of the vin - vineyard venture.
And so, I paid him, as a consult, to help design a restaurant, and how it would lay
out on the hill, and I ultimately paid him $25,000 in consulting fees. (Tr., Vol. I,
p. 166, L. 5)
[Mr. Berryhill could] offer insight, as a restaurateur, on how a restaurant might be
designed, or how many tables in a certain area, or kitchen layout. (Tr., Vol. I, p.
175, L. 9)
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In addition to utilizing Mr. Berryhill's knowledge and expertise in designing restaurants,
Mosell intended to build a Berryhill & Company restaurant ("Berryhill Restaurant") within the
Polo Cove development and intended that Mr. Berryhill would participate in the ultimate success
of the project.
I'm a partner in Polo Cove. So, if I was a partner in a restaurant venture, then I
can bring opportunities to that restaurant or add whatever skill set I might have,
you know and that - that comes with a real estate background. And so, we looked
at the opportunities even in downtown Boise; all right? But if! was a part of a
restaurant, half owner of a restaurant, then maybe I would pursue opportunities
where a restaurant would be an amenity to the project. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 171, L. 3)

***
I paid John Berryhill $25,000 for consulting work, to work toward design of a
restaurant at Polo Cove. When we agreed on the buy-in - or the sale of half of his
company to me, at that point the consulting fee wasn't appropriate. He would be
working toward a common goal of opportunity at Polo Cove, and so [sic]. (Tr.,
Vol. I, p. 241, L. 14; emphasis added)
Mosell also acknowledged that the Berryhill name and reputation increased the value of
the development.
Q:

Let me ask you about another one. Merely by him, meaning Berryhill,
branding the restaurant, overseeing those operations, with really no need
for him to invest his own monies in that real estate, he would enhance the
value of the surrounding vineyard and uses.

A:

Correct.

(Tr., Vol. I, p. 360, L. 6)
Q:

And so, you paid the $400,000, and it was in part to recognize the value of
the Berryhill name?

A:

Correct.

(Tr. Vol. I, p. 362, Ll.I4-16)
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Q:

A.

And is it fair to say that the PKF Consulting Group, in their feasibility
study, indicated that Mr. Berryhill's strong and loyal following added or
increased the feasibility of the overall development?

Correct.

(Tr. Vol. I, p. 366, Ll. 11-16; Defendant's Exhibit 11J, p. 6)

Mosell ordered Polo Cove business cards for Mr. Berryhill with the title of "Partner" (Tr.,
Vol. I, p. 603, L. 6-16; Defendant's Exhibit N). Mr. Berryhill did not recall any other Polo Cove
cards referring to partner (Tr., Vol. I, p. 605, L. 6).
Mosell initially contemplated a small, wine-country development of290 acres. Robert
Taunton, a consultant for Polo Cove, testified as follows:
At the time that I started working on the project [2007], the first phase of
the Polo Cove overall project, which is roughly about 300 acres, was in
public hearings in front ofthe Planning Commission out in Canyon
County for a conditional use permit. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 196, L. 6-10)
And then, after that we started working on a larger scale planning project
for the total property which was 1,600 acres. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 196, L. 16)
I thought that the initial development approval on the 300 acres, which
was a winery, hotel, restaurant, education facility, and some residential in
the - I the vines, really had a lot of merit and had potential in the
marketplace. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 202, L. 11-15)
The project more than quintupled, expanding from 290 acres to 1,600 acres. The Polo
Cove Executive Overview was circulated to potential investors (Tr., Vol. I, p. 201, L. 9-18). The
Executive Overview drafted on behalf of Plaintiff dated June 18, 2008 states that, in addition to
the 290 original acres, it "secured and funded land options for approximately 1,100 acres
adjacent to the resort and winery parcel" (Defendant's Exhibit DDD, page 13). The Illustrative
Map drafted by Plaintiffs architect (Ibid, page 16) shows that a charter school, education center,
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artisan center, interpretive center, winemakers lodge, fire stations, health and wellness center,
sporting center, parks, storage barns, water reclamation facility, polo and event fields, an
equestrian center and an amphitheater, were just some of the intended attractions.
Mr. Berryhill testified regarding Plaintiffs Exhibit 25, reading from a portion as
follows:
For - for the new downtown location of his restaurant, John Berryhill has recently
partnered with developer Glenn Mosell. The two are also developing Polo Cove,
a I,600-acre living and resort community in the Snake River Valley Appalachian.
A Berryhill's restaurant will anchor a boutique hotel, vineyard homes, a winery,
spa, sporting club, and an equestrian center with polo fields. Catering and special
events will be a primary focus, with vineyard weddings and receptions, festivals,
concerts, and corporate events. Polo Cove is 30 minutes from Boise and is
surrounded by 360 degree views of the Owyhee Mountains and the Boise
Foothills. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 575, L. I5-p. 576, L.I; Plaintiffs Exhibit 25)
Steve Inch, owner of Propel Communications, with 25 years of marketing and brand
development, was an independent contractor working with Mogul Development Group, in
partnership with Mosell, and was hired to create a package to present to potential investors of
Polo Cove (Tr., Vol. I, p. 853, L. 6). When asked about his understanding of the role of the
Berryhill Restaurant with regard to a gourmet restaurant at Polo Cove, Mr. Inch stated:
My understanding was that there was some type of partnership arrangement
between Polo Cove deVelopment and Berryhill, and that Berryhill was the
restaurant that would be a key draw to potential guests to the development itself,
on - in the early stages. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 855, L. 15)

***
... [I]t was presented in a way, to me, that Berryhill is involved in this
development, and that they were - the Berryhill name is an important part of the
development itself. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 855, L. 25)
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Mr. Inch stated that the Berryhill name had a "pretty high equity" in terms of the local
marketplace and explained that as follows:
A:

Well, we're - one of the things that is - is important to understand is,
when you're creating a new development it's an - an issue of point of
difference in the marketplace. What makes Polo Cove unique to another
development that maybe have similar amenities?
And my understanding is that - and I think rightly so - bringing on a name
such as Berryhill, and that brand equity that exists in the marketplace,
which means - there's brand equity and there's brand image, and they're
very different.

***
Q:

When you - when you're talking about leveraging someone's brand
equity, can you put that in layman's terms.

A:

Michael Jordan and Nike. If-whether or not Nike sells a shoe or not,
they still pay for the value of the Michael Jordan name. This is similarly
what I believe was done at Polo Cove. That without having anything other
than the vineyards and the beautiful views, which are tremendous,
Berryhill was something someone could touch, feel, taste, and realize as
being in existence, thus adding credibility to the development.
And the reality is, there's a - years of investment in that name and there's
value in that.

(Tr., Vol. I, p. 856, L. 10)
Mr. Berryhill devoted substantial amounts of time to the Polo Cove venture, working
with the original architects, running the architect group, coordinating the efforts ofthe web
designer and art direction. During that whole time, Mr. Berryhill was trying to put Mosell' s
vision to paper, getting it developed to build (Tr., Vol. I, p. 680, L. 3; Defendant's Exhibit
FFFF). Mr. Berryhill did so upon his understanding with Mosell, as Mosell testified above, that
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Mr. Berryhill would participate in the Polo Cove profits beyond operation of the restaurant (Ir.,
Vol. I, p. 359, L. 21 - p. 360, L. 5).
At Mosell's urging, the Berryhill Restaurant moved to downtown Boise at the Plaza 121
location. Mosell told Mr. Berryhill that they needed a sexy space, something better than a strip
mall, where the Berryhill restaurant was previously located. And downtown has - is "sexy" (Ir.,
Vol. I, p. 579, L. 23). Ihey also needed a place to "wine and dine" investors and to show "the
essence of what we were developing at Polo Cove" (Ir., Vol. I, p. 580, L. 4). Mr. Berryhill
testified that Mosell wanted a sexy place downtown: "I can't bring my clients that are going to
invest a million dollars to an ugly strip mall behind a Firestone Iire Store. 1 need a sexy place so
we can sell this, so we can sell you, so we can sell the Berryhill name" (Ir., Vol. I, p. 716, Ll. 1319).
Mr. Berryhill started the Berryhill Restaurant in March of 1998 (Ir., Vol. I, p. 427, L. 22).
The restaurant was originally in the 8th Street Marketplace in downtown Boise, however it had to
be relocated due to the demolition and reconstruction of BODO. Mr. Berryhill moved the
restaurant to a strip mall on Broadway Avenue in Boise (Ir., Vol. I, p. 582, L. 3). Mr. Berryhill
wanted to eventually move downtown but testified as to why he agreed to move at that time as
follows:
1 was fine in an ugly strip mall hidden behind a Firestone Iire store in what used
to be a condom shop, doing wonderful. I had always loved downtown. 1 was
downtown before, and I was in the Downtown Business Association before. Yes,
I love downtown. I would love to go back to downtown. 1 did not go to 120 [sic]
North Ninth Street because I wanted to be back downtown. 1 went there because
your client [Mosell] and I, together, chose this sexy restaurant to spearhead Polo
Cove. (Ir., Vol. I, p. 476, L. 14)
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I - I didn't have a - I liked downtown, I enjoyed downtown, I enjoyed being a part
of the DBA when I was down there previously. The First Thursdays that go on,
there's a lot of activity that went on being downtown. I didn't have that being out
on Broadway. However, I wasn't seeking space. I had no timeline or - I don't
think I ever voiced, even in my head, that I ever wanted to go back downtown. I
didn't have a - I didn't have a view of - or vision, or projection of going back
downtown. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 582, Ll. 8-17)
When asked if it was Mosell' s idea to move the restaurant downtown, Mr. Berryhill
responded:
Absolutely ... He [Mosell] was meeting with investors that wanted to open a
restaurant for a million dollars a key. He did not want to take them to a strip mall.
(Tr., Vol. I, p. 477, L. 2)
Mr. Berryhill further testified regarding Mosell' s attempts to identify potential
downtown restaurant locations:
He [Mosell] started finding properties that - that originally you would have to
build out and, I assume, use a builder. Properties like where the Spaghetti Factory
is, used to be Louie's. And we went and looked at it, and he was talking about he
had already found out that you could build, on top of it, condos and actually even
go taller than the phone - I believe it's the phone company building beside it, to
view - there was no variance, I believe was the term, that you couldn't build on
top. That was - that was one .... He talked to commercial real estate brokers,
another developer. We both met with Gary Christensen and Robert Kaylor ofR.
Grey, who started the R. Grey Lofts where the AppleOne building is, where
AppleOne - or iPod, down at Eighth Street, to buy that space. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 580,
L. 19-p.581, L. 15)
Mr. Berryhill testified that Mosell took the lead in identifying a new downtown location
because Mr. Berryhill was busy running his restaurant was not a real estate broker (Tr., Vol. I, p.
581, Ll. 18-23).
Mosell and Mr. Berryhill had previously hired an attorney, Kimbell Gourley, in relation to
a purchase and sale contract for the purchase of a strip mall on Broadway Avenue in Boise (Tr.,
Vol. I, p. 826, L. 16). They met with Mr. Gourley again on March 6, 2007 to discuss the
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proposed formation of a new corporation to be known as MoBerry Corporation (Tr., Vol. I, p.
827, L. 23). Mr. Gourley's understanding was that Mr. Berryhill and Mosell Equities were to
become shareholders of this new corporation (Tr., Vol. I, p. 827, L. 23). Mr. Gourley
subsequently sent drafts of the documents to the parties, leaving blanks because the parties had
not resolved everything. When asked if it was his understanding that the transaction was going
to take the form of a loan from Mosell Equities to Berryhill & Company, Mr. Gourley responded:
The term - to my recollection, the term loan was never used. I never understood
that there was going to be a loan that was made. And to be honest with you, it
would be inconsistent with - with a capital contribution into a corporation. And
so, I - nobody discussed that with me. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 829, L. 19)
The lease for the new downtown restaurant space at Plaza 121 was signed on April 12,
2007 (Tr., Vol. I, p. 681, L. 9; Plaintiff s Exhibit FFFF); both Mosell and Mr. Berryhill signed
the Personal Guaranty for the lease (Tr., Vol. I, p. 885, L. 3; Plaintiff s Exhibit G). On June 28,
2007 (approximately two months after the lease was signed), Mosell wrote a check to Berryhill &
Company, for $50,000. In a handwritten note on a copy of the check is the following notation:
This is a loan from Mosell Equities to cover some misc. downtown expenses
during our bookkeeper transition. It will go into the general check register & be
used for any billing of payables needed for downtown or Berryhill & Co.
lt will be transitioned into part of Glenn's "buy in" of MoBerry Venture Corp. Inc.
(Tr., Vol. I, p. 147, L. 13; Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 [emphasis added])
The parties had never discussed loans and when Mr. Berryhill was asked what he
understood the money to be, he testified, "Well, I never understood it to be a loan. We never
discussed it as a loan" (Tr., Vol. I, p. 441, L. 19). Mr. Berryhill further testified:
At the - at that time, I had - I saw nothing wrong with it because Glenn and I
never discussed this money that he paid as a loan.... The word loan never came
up until I saw that he wrote on the check. And I asked, we're doing this thing, this
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is not a loan, why are you writing a loan? And he said we have to classifY it as
something. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 443, L. 12-19)
I believe my original testimony was that that word is a loan, and it was given to
me by [Mosell], and - however, I did not have, at the time, an issue with it,
because I turned and asked him, is - and I'm actually referring to the loan on the
check, not the loan that I wrote below - and I asked him, well, this is not a loan.
And he said, we have to call it something. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 523, L. 23)
I understood Glenn to say that it was not a loan, but we had to call it something,
so we could put it on the books and just park it so it would have - it wouldn't
have to move until we signed the documents, and put in on a specific tax year. It
could sit there. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 788, L. 16)
From June 28,2007 to April 30, 2008, Mosell wrote checks totaling $405,000 (Plaintiffs
Exhibits 2-11.) When asked if he noticed that some, but not all, of the checks have the word loan
written in the memo line, Berryhill testified that he did not see all of the checks until the lawsuit
due to the fact that the checks went to his general manager at the time (Tr., Vol. I, p. 590, L. 25p. 591, L. 9).
When asked if he thought it was a loan, Mr. Berryhill testified:
My understanding today, what the plaintiff is saying this loan means, is not what I
understood when this was written, because that's not what he said. We never
talked about that he could get it back. We never talked about it being a short-term
loan. It was, as he stated, an inter - interim substitute. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 587, L. 4-9)
Mr. Berryhill also testified that there was no doubt in his mind, at that time, that the
transition would occur (Tr., Vol. I, p. 586, L. 22).
Although Mosell had an economics degree and extensive real estate and financial
experience, he never presented Mr. Berryhill with a note or any other documents relating to any
purported "loan" (Tr., Vol. I, p. 593, L. 21). For his part, Mr. Berryhill testified that he has no
legal or accounting training (Tr., Vol. I, p. 585, L. 9-13).
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The parties never signed the documents drafted by Mr. Gourley. In December, 2007, the
parties met with Amy Dempsey, a CPA with the firm Riche, Dempsey & Associates, Chartered.
The parties told Ms. Dempsey that they had some joint business proceedings dealing with a
development called Polo Cove and that the expertise of both parties was required to put the
project together. She understood that the name-brand of Berryhill & Company would be an
anchor to the development and a draw for people who were going to be buying into Polo Cove as
well as staying there (Tr., Vol. I, p. 792, L. 11). The parties further explained that the move from
the strip mall to downtown would bump up the image of Berryhill & Company. The parties
would also have a front for Polo Cove where people walking downtown could obtain information
on Polo Cove (Tr., Vol. I, p. 793, L. 19).
Ms. Dempsey testified that the parties had several meetings to try to put something
together to understand the end goal of the parties, of what exactly was taking place (Tr., Vol. I, p.
794, L. 1). When asked if she, after several meetings, understood what the parties were trying to
achieve, Ms. Dempsey replied, "I do not." She stated the reason was "Because I could never get
a straight answer, from either Glenn or John, on what we would put together, if that is exactly
what they were trying to achieve" (Tr., Vol. I, p. 794, L. 17).
Ms. Dempsey further testified that she understood there were funds from Mosell being
deposited into the Berryhill Restaurant account. When asked what understanding she gained
from her meetings with Mosell regarding those funds, Ms. Dempsey replied:
There was no clear definition of what the monies were for because there was a lot
of activity that was going on from - where John was working out of the Broadway
location to moving downtown. There was a lot of expenses being incurred to
move forward this idea of Polo Cove.
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So, these monies going in - at one point in time, we just didn't have an
explanation for it. And that is why we had meetings and trying to define it, as
well as meetings with attorneys to get documents signed, because nothing was
ever clearly defined by the two parties of what exactly those monies were for.
(Tr., Vol. I, p. 795, Ll. 3-14).
When asked if she recalled asking Mosell that question, she replied that Mosell told her, "Well,
just when we get there, we'll get there (Tr., Vol. I, p. 795, L. 19).
Ms. Dempsey further testified regarding any purported "loan:"
Q.

What did Mr. Mosell say to you, if anything, about the funds being a loan?

A.

Well, he never was really clear if it was a loan, or if it was compensation
for John's services for consulting fees, or if it was reimbursement of build
out for the Polo Cove space. There was nothing ever clearly defined. It
would just change from one day to the next so to speak.

Q.

Did you ask John the same question?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Did you get any clear answer?

A.

No.

Q.

Who did you expect to answer that question?

A.

Well, I expected that Glenn would have an answer for me because it was
him putting the money in, and because the money was kind of coming in
piecemeal as they were moving towards their goal. It's not like it was one
lump sum transferred in at one point in time.

Q.

How was - how were those funds accounted for in the Berryhill &
Company books?

A.

There were coded as what is termed a long-term liability.

Q.

And what did that signify.
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A.

What that signified to me is that it was in a holding pattern until we had
legal documentation to define how I was going to be able to treat those
from an accounting standpoint.

(Tr., Vol. I, p. 796, L 1 - p. 797, L. 2)
Mosell never told Ms. Dempsey that the funds were considered a loan and never provided
her with a copy of Exhibit 1 (Tr., Vol. I, p. 798, L. 1). Mosell testified that he considered the
funds to be an "interim substitute" until his buy-in of MoBerry Venture Corp. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 321,

L. 25- p. 323, L. 16).
James Tomlinson, is in the commercial real estate business in Boise and is the head of a
group of investors that own and operate the building located at Plaza 121 where Berryhill's
Restaurant moved in August 2007 (Tr., Vol. I, p. 881, L. 17-23). Mr. Tomlinson testified that
when his company received a letter of intent from Berryhill, Inc. [sic] to rent the space at Plaza
121, they questioned who the partners were and were told "the two of them" referring to
Berryhill and Mosell (Tr., Vol. I, p. 884, L. 13-17). Mr. Tomlinson further testified:
I didn't get a sense as to what - who owned the stock. Berryhill was a
corporation, and - and I was told that these two folks owned it. And they both
had agreed to sign a guarantee. And so, that was the limit to my investigation, I
guess, of - Berryhill Company, so. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 894, Ll. 15-20)

***
Obviously, I was told by them, because we then gave each of them a signature
card authorizing us to investigate their background, and we asked each of them to
sign a guarantee. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 895, Ll. 3-6)
Mr. Tomlinson also testified that a few months after Berryhill & Company's restaurant
moved into Plaza 121, he was approached by Mosell and Mr. Berryhill regarding leasing
additional space at Plaza 121. His understanding was that it would be used for Polo Cove. He
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admitted he was "lukewarm" and talked to one or both of the parties several times before finally
agreeing to the expansion. There would be a retail storefront that would give exposure to the
Polo Cove concept (Tr., Vol. I, p. 886, L. 21 - p. 887, L. 2).
Mr. Tomlinson further testified that during one of his tours of the expansion space,
Mosell was "waving his hands and talking about where computers would be located, and how
they would be packed up and moved into a backroom in the evenings, so that the - the retail
space could be converted to more of a lounge and - and a multi-use space." (Tr., Vol. I, p. 887,
L. 20-24).

When Mr. Berryhill was asked whose idea it was to lease the expansion space, he testified
that it was Mosell' s. Mr. Berryhill further testified that he tried to put together various scenarios
because he was concerned about the cost. However, Mosell advised Mr. Berryhill that he would
fund the new banquet and ballroom and Polo Cove would fund the show room. (Tr., Vol. I, p.
626, L. 12- p. 628, L. 25). Mr. Berryhill testified that Mosell wanted a showroom to showcase
Polo Cove; to have a "sexy office" with visual aids, posters and pictures of the development.
(Tr., Vol. I, p. 622, L. 17-24).
Mosell Equities paid rent for the Expansion Area/Polo Cove Showroom for a total of
eight months, the last check dated July 17,2008. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 674, L. 10 - p. 675, L6;
Defendant's Exhibit 00.) Mosell made no further payment. At the time of trial, the amount
owing for the expansion space was $149,255.01 (Tr., Vol. I, p. 632, L. 9).
When asked about Plaintiffs Exhibit 11, the $20,000 check with "Suite 101 TIs" on the
memo line, and what relationship that check had with the buy-in of Mosell Equities, Mr.
Berryhill testified:
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Our agreement on the TIs for the expansion space would be that Berryhill would
pay for part of it, the ballrooms, and Polo Cove would pay for the Polo Cove
space. And this 20,000 was the TIs for the Polo Cave Polo Cove Suite 101
space .... He said that - and we both agreed that this - the TIs for Polo Cove
did not go into the buy-in. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 616, L. 4-17)
When asked if Mosell ever provided the full amount agreed to complete the buy-in of
Mosell Equities, Mr. Berryhill replied, "He did not" (Tr., Vol. I, p. 616, L. 18-21).

Mr. Berryhill testified that the cost to remodel the restaurant was $100,048.43 and the
cost for the expansion space was $193,801.29, for a total of $293,849.72 (Tr., Vol. I, p. 688, L.
23 - p. 690, L. 14; Defendant's Exhibit CCC-l). Mosell did not dispute that the final tenant
improvements totaled approximately $300,000 (Tr., Vol. I, p. 327, L. 5-20). Mosell testified that
the original estimate for TIs to the downtown location was only $50,000 (Tr., Vol. I, p. 346, L.
18 - p. 347, L. 6; Plaintiffs Exhibit 19) (emphasis added).
James Tomlinson also testified that under the terms of the lease for Plaza 121, the only
items that could be removed at the termination of the lease would be "tables and chairs,
effectively moveable equipment." He also referenced paragraph 12 of the lease: "All alterations,
additions and improvements, except fixtures which shall not become part of the building, shall
remain in and be surrendered with the premises as a part thereof at the termination of this lease"
(Tr., Vol. I, p. 889, L. 2-24; Defendant's Exhibit G). Thus, the bulk of the funds provided by
Mosell Equities went to tenant improvements of the restaurant and "expansion space," which
will remain with the building at the expiration of any lease.
At the same time Mosell stopped paying rent on the Polo Cove showroom, he began to
address the subject of the contributions made by Mosell Equities. At first he indicated that he
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"would like to look at owning fewer shares and getting some cash back" (Tr., Vol. I, p. 324, Ll.
10-12).
In a subsequent email to Mr. Berryhill dated September 9, 2008, Mosell wrote: "John ...
We need to get together to talk about my investment/divestment in Berryhill and 'lease' ... Let
me know when you're available ... (Tr., Vol. I, p. 414, Ll. 10-15; Defendant's Exhibit MMM, p.
3). On October 6,2008, Mosell again wrote, "John ... I think it's time to discuss our positions
again .. When are you available this week. .. 1'd also like to go over my capital contributions with
John... Thanks ... Glenn" (Tr. Vol. 1., p. 415, L. 25 - p. 416, L. 12; Plaintiffs Exhibit 38).
In none of these communications did Mosell refer to the transactions as a "loan."
Yet, on May 28,2009, Mosell Equities filed this action against Defendants Berryhill &
Company, John Berryhill and Amy Berryhill for theories of recovery all based on the false
premise that the series of transactions constituted nothing more than a simple loan.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether Mosell Equities failed to preserve any objections to the issues submitted
to and decided by the jury by failing to object to the corresponding jury
instructions.

2.

Whether the jury was properly instructed.

3.

Whether there was substantial, competent evidence to support the verdict of the
JUry.

ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL

Defendant Berryhill & Company is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(3).
The "gravamen" of Mosell Equities' claim deals with a commercial transaction under Great
Plains Equip. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 136 Idaho 466, 471, 36 P.3d 218, 223 (2001).
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Further, Mosell Equities alleges a commercial transaction and claimed entitlement to fees
pursuant to I.e. § 12-120(3) in its complaint (R. Vol. I, p. 98, Ll. 19-22). See, Garner v. Pavey,
_Idaho _,259 P.3d 608, 615 (2011). Thus, Defendant should be granted its attorney fees,
including those on appeal.

ARGUMENT

1.

Plaintiff did not object to the jury instructions and special verdict placing the
contract issue before the jury, thereby failing to preserve this issue for a
motion for JNOV and appeal.

According to clear authority from this Court, a party may not raise an issue in a motion
for JNOV proceeding if that party failed to object to a jury instruction on the same issue. This
line of authority is based on I.R. C.P. Rule 51 (b), which states in relevant part:
No party may assign as error the giving of or failure to give an instruction unless
the party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating
distinctly the instruction to which that party objects and the grounds ofthe
objection.
In Bates v. Seldin, 146 Idaho 772, 203 P .3d 702 (2009), this Court made clear the
requirement that a party first object to a jury instruction or special verdict form on an issue in
order to preserve that issue for a motion JNOV. In that case the Appellants complained that the
interplay between the contract and urDust enrichment claims was legally erroneous. This Court
found, however, that, having failed to object to the legal error in the instructions, Appellant could
not raise the issue on a motion for JNOV. Further, the Court found that they had failed to
preserve the issue for appeal. 146 Idaho at 776.
It is not sufficient for a party to have submitted a pre-trial jury instruction different from
that given to the jury by the district court. In Jones v. Crawfarth, 147 Idaho 11, 19-20, 205 P Jd
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660, 668-669 (2009), the appellant B&B submitted a set of proposed jury instructions that
included a non-party on the special verdict form. At the jury instruction conference, however,
B&B failed to object to a form of special verdict that omitted the non-party. This Court said:
"we find that the language in Rule 51 (b) is controlling, and B&B may not assign as error the
failure to include Haemonetics on the special verdict form when it did not distinctly object to the
exclusion of Haemonetics from the form." 147 Idaho at 20. B&B did not raise the issue again
until consideration of its motion for JNOV. Doing so did not preserve the issue for appeal. 147
Idaho at 20.
In the recent case of St. Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Assocs., LLP, 148 Idaho
479,224 P.3d 1068 (2009), this Court also made clear that the same rule applies whether the
instruction deals with an alleged error of law or an issue of fact:
St. Alphonsus argues, 'Saint Alphonsus also renewed this argument post-trial,
explaining that "[a]s a matter oflaw, the MRIA partnership was not a partnership
for a term, and it was an error in law to submit this issue to the jury.'" It is too
late to raise an alleged error in the jury instructions in a post-trial motion for a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, a new trial.
148 Idaho at 491, citing, Bates v. Seldin, supra, 146 Idaho at 775-76. See also, Coombs v.

Curnow, 148 Idaho 129, 137,219 P.3d 453,461 (2009), "a court does not have the power to
amend the record to 'correct ajudicial error,'" citing, Donaldson v. Henry, 63 Idaho 467, 473,
121 P.2d 445,447 (1941)).
Here, as in Jones v. Crawforth, supra, Plaintiff submitted jury instructions and a proposed
form of special verdict indicating that, although Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 constituted a contract, it was
ambiguous (R., Voir., pp. 1026-1027, 1039, 1040, 1041, 1060-1064). The trial court gave both
parties the chance to place on the record any objections, proposed changes, additions or deletions
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to the jury instructions and the form of verdict (Tr., p. 919, L1.l6-22). When afforded an
opportunity to object to the jury instructions and special verdict actually given by the trial court
to the jury, however, Mosell Equities' counsel indicated instead:
... we used to object to all of the - the defendant's proposed instructions, we used
to object to all of the proposed instructions that we presented that weren't given,
and then we were supposed to object to all of the - all of the proposed instructions
that were gi ven.
But I like all of our instructions, so I'm not going to object to the Court's
instructions.
That's all I have, Your Honor. Thank you.
(Tr., Vol. I, p. 919, L. 25 - p. 920, Ll. 1-8).
Although Defendant pointed out to the trial court that Mosell Equities had failed to object
to those instructions placing contract formation squarely before the jury (R. Vol. I, p. 1364, L. 15
- p. 1365, L. 2), the trial court granted Plaintiffs motion for judgment NOV on contract
formation nonetheless. 3 Such was reversible error. Mosell Equities did not preserve this issue
for its motion for JNOV and, as in St. Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Assocs., LLP,

supra, likewise this Court should not consider it on appeal. 148 Idaho at 492.
Even if Mosell Equities had somehow preserved this issue, the jury was properly
instructed and its verdict on the issue was not "clearly erroneous" so as to warrant an order
JNOV, as set forth below.

See, Order of Clarification (R., Vol. I, p. 1421, Ll. 17-23). The trial court
explained that he had "failed to properly instruct the jury" to reflect the prior summary judgment
order of the district court - that Exhibit 1 was an express contract - and what was left at issue for
the jury was its ambiguity.
3
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2.

A judgment notwithstanding the verdict is only granted when the jUry'S
factual determinations are "clearly erroneous."

In Schroeder v. Partin, _ Idaho _,259 P.3d 617,622 (2011), this Court recently
repeated the standard for reviewing orders notwithstanding the verdict:
This Court reviews a district court's grant of JNOV under the same standard the
district court used in ruling on the motion. Coombs v. Curnow, 148 Idaho 129,
136,219 P.3d 453, 460 (2009). Since the validity ofa liquidated damages clause
is a question of fact, an appellate court must affirm the fact finder unless the
findings are clearly erroneous. Clampitt v. A.MR. Corp., 109 Idaho 145, 149, 706
P.2d 34, 38 (1985). For the purpose ofa motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict, the moving party admits any adverse facts, and the Court must draw all
inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Coombs, 148 Idaho
at 136, 219 P.3d at 460. Only the jury may weigh evidence and assess witness
credibility. Id A district court's grant of JNOV is only proper if reasonable minds
could not reach the conclusion reflected in the jury's verdict. Id (emphasis added)
Similarly, in Coombs, supra, this Court emphasized that "[a]n order granting aj.n.o.v. is
appropriate when 'the facts are undisputed' and 'there can be but one conclusion as to the verdict
that reasonable minds could have reached' --namely, that the moving party should prevail." 148
Idaho at 136, quoting, O'Neil v. Schuckardt, 112 Idaho 472, 480, 733 P.2d 693, 701 (1986). The
Court went on to describe how the Court should evaluate the evidence:
... this Court may not weigh the evidence, attempt to judge the credibility of the
witnesses, or compare its factual findings with those of the jury. Hall v. Farmers
Alliance Mut. Ins. Co., 145 Idaho 313, 324, 179 P.3d 276, 287 (2008). Instead,
the Court must review the evidence as a whole, drawing all inferences 'in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party' and 'view[ing] the facts as if the moving
party has admitted the truth of all the non-moving [party's] evidence.' Jeremiah,
131 Idaho at 247, 953 P.2d at 997. The Court will' not examine any conflicting
evidence presented by the moving party to refute the non-moving party's claims.'
Karlson, 140 Idaho at 567, 97 P.3d at 434.
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148 Idaho at 136). See also, Gillingham Construction, Inc., v. Newby-Wiggins Construction,

Inc., 142 Idaho 15,21,121 P.3d 946, 952 (2005) (reversing grant of motion for JNOV where
district court impermissibly weighed the evidence).
Unfortunately, in this case the trial court simply assumed that the jury based its finding of
no breach of contract on the grounds that no contract existed, rather than that no breach occurred.
Accordingly, it felt obliged to grant a motion for JNOV on the issue of contract formation. What
the trial court ignored was that the jury was asked to determine the parties' intent as to an
ambiguous contract and whether a breach occurred. Intent is obviously a disputed factual
determination; this was not a situation where there could be but "one conclusion as to the verdict
that reasonable minds could have reached." Rather, there was substantial, competent evidence
that Berryhill & Company did not commit a breach of contract, as determined by the jury. Thus,
an order JNOV was inappropriate.

3.

The jury was properly instructed.

At the hearing on Mosell Equities' motion for JNOV (JNOV Tr., Vol. 1., p. 104, L. 24 - p.
105, L.

5t and its subsequent written Order of Clarification (R. Vol. I, p. 1421, Ll. 17-23), the

trial court stated its belief that it had erred in failing to instruct the jury that Exhibit 1 constituted
a contract. Upon that basis, the trial court granted Plaintiffs motion for JNOV on that issue and
indicated that the parties would be going back to trial on the rest of the express contract issues
(JNOV Tr., Vol. I, p. 106, Ll. 2-7. For several reasons, Berryhill & Company submits that this
alleged error forms an inadequate basis for granting JNOV and requiring the parties to go
through the expense of a new trial.

4

The transcript ofthe JNOV hearing is hereinafter referred to as "JNOV Tr."
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As the Court is fully aware, the standard of review for issues concerning jury instructions
is limited to a determination whether the instructions, as a whole, fairly and adequately present
the issues and state the law. Silver Creek Computers, Inc. v. Petra, Inc., 136 Idaho 879, 882,42
P.3d 672,675 (2002); Ricketts v. E. Idaho Equip., Co., Inc., 137 Idaho 578, 581, 51 P.3d 392,
395 (2002). In Gillingham Constr., Inc. v. Newly-Wiggins Constr., Inc., supra, 142 Idaho at 24,
for instance, this Court reversed a district court's grant of JNOV and new trial based on a
supposed error in instructions to the jury. The district court had concluded that a contractual
provision was unambiguous and it should have so instructed the jury. This Court disagreed,
saying that the provision was ambiguous given the conflicting testimony over the clause's
meaning and that a contrary instruction "would have improperly instructed the jury on the
interpretation of the parties' contract." 142 Idaho at 24. This Court concluded that "[t]he
instructions fairly and accurately instructed the jury on the law and issues to be decided. The
district court abused its discretion in finding the instructions were improper." 142 Idaho at 24.
We face a similar situation. Having properly and fairly instructed the jury as to the
elements of a contract, upon the motion for JNOV the trial court decided it should have gone
further and told them specifically that Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 constituted a contract. At summary
judgment, the district court noted that "[c]ontact formation is generally a question of fact to be
determined by the trier of fact," citing, P.o. Ventures, Inc., v. Locks Family Irrevocable Trust,
144 Idaho 233, 237, 159 P.3d 870, 874. In denying competing motions for summary judgment
on the breach of contract claim, the district court concluded:
The question of whether the contract or contracts were breached hinges on
whether the trier of fact determines that there was a binding contract formed and
what a reasonable time for performance of the contract is. If the trier of fact
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detennines that there was a contract and that the reasonable time for perfonnance
(repayment) has passed, then Berryhill & Co is in breach of the contracts.
There remains material questions of fact. The court therefore denies the
Plaintiffs and Defendant's Motions for Summary Judgment as to Count One. (R.
Vol. I, p. 756, L. 26 - p. 757, L. 2) (emphasis added).5
"If a breach of contract is alleged, the burden is upon the claimant to show 'the making of
the contract, an obligation assumed by defendants, and their breach or failure to meet such
obligation.'" Reynolds v. American Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., 115 Idaho 362, 365, 766 P.2d 1243,
1246 (1988), quoting, Thomas v. Cats, 78 Idaho 29, 31, 296 P.2d 1033,1035 (1956). "[A]
contract must be complete, definite and certain in all its material tenns, or contain provisions
which are capable in themselves of being reduced to certainty." Kohring v. Robertson, 137 Idaho
94,99,44 P.3d 1149,1154 (2002), quoting Giacobbi Square v. PEK Corp., 105 Idaho 346, 348,
670 P.2d 51, 53 (1983); see also, Kidd Island Bay Water Users Coop. (1ss'n v. Miller, 136 Idaho
571,574,38 P.3d 609, 612 (2001) (The tenns of a contract must be sufficiently definite and
certain in order to be enforceable).
Idaho's contract law is no different in this regard from that of other jurisdictions:
'A contract is an agreement between two or more parties for the doing or not
doing of some specified thing.' O.C.G.A. § 13-1-1. 'In order that it may allege an
agreement, a petition must set forth a contract of such certainty and completeness
that either party may have a right of action upon it.' Peachtree Med Bldg. v.
Keel, 107 Ga. App. 438, 440 (130 S.E.2d 530) (1963). 'The requirement of
certainty extends not only to the subject matter and purpose of the contract, but
also to the parties, consideration, and even the time and place of perfonnance
where these are essential. When a contract is substantially alleged, some details
might be supplied under the doctrines of reasonable time or reasonable
requirements. But indefiniteness in subject matter so extreme as not to present

Unfortunately, earlier the district court also stated that "the Court finds that the
June 2008 agreement [Plaintiffs Exhibit 1] does constitute a valid contract; however, its tenns
are ambiguous and its interpretation is a question of fact" (R., Vol. I, p. 755, Ll. 8-15).
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anything upon which the contract may operate in a definite manner renders the
contract void .... ' (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Peachtree Med., supra at
441. Furthermore, "[the first requirement of the law relative to contracts is that
there must be a meeting of the minds of the parties, and mutuality, and in order for
the contract to be valid the agreement must ordinarily be expressed plainly and
explicitly enough to show what the parties agreed upon. A contract cannot be
enforced in any form of action if its terms are incomplete or incomprehensible."

Jackson v. Williams, 209 Ga. App. 640, 642-643 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993) (further citations omitted).
Throughout this litigation Mosell Equities has relied on Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 as the
alleged express contract at issue in this case. As indicated above, Exhibit 1 is a handwritten note
on a copy of a $50,000 check from Mosell Equities to Berryhill & Company, Inc., indicating that
"this" is a loan that "will be transitioned" into a "buy in." The document is silent as to the
parties' intent as to what happens if, for any reason, the transition does not occur. Mosell
Equities pretends that it is clear that the $50,000 remains a loan regardless of whether the
"transition" occurs or not, but the note itself does not state anything ofthe sort. In fact, Glenn
Mosell indicated the opposite, when he told John Berryhill "we have to call it something" (Tr.
Vol. I, p. 523, L. 23).
Thus, the element of definiteness is entirely lacking, demonstrating a lack of a meeting of
the minds of the parties. Berryhill & Company, Inc., was entitled to have the trier of fact decide
as a factual matter whether there was an adequate meeting of the minds to form a bonafide
contract. The trial court understood this fact when it decided Mosell Equities' motion for
directed verdict. As is well known, the standards for a directed verdict and for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict are the same. See, e.g., Coombs v. Curnow, supra, 148 Idaho at 148
(Horton, J., concurring) ("In Idaho, a motion for j.n.o.v. is simply treated as a delayed motion for
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a directed verdict, and the same standards are applied") (citations omitted). Addressing the
<'loan" language of Exhibit 1 and some of the subsequent checks, in denying Mosell Equities'
motion for a directed verdict on the breach of contract count, the trial court stated:
But I can see how there may have been a different intent at the time. So, the issue
as to whether there was a meeting of the minds is something that can be
legitimately pursued and presented to the jury, and the jury will make a decision.
(Tr., Vol. I, p. 556, Ll. 7-13). The trial court correctly analyzed the issue on Mosell Equities'
motion for directed verdict and then properly instructed the jury on the issue. The trial court's
jury instructions, without objection from Mosell Equities, fairly and accurately instructed the jury
on all of the requisites. Accordingly, Berryhill & Company submits that the jury was properly
and fairly instructed and the trial court should not have concluded otherwise in granting JNOV.
In the alternative, even if the trial court should have instructed the jury that Exhibit 1
constituted a contract, such error was harmless. Under Rule 61, LR.C.P.,
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence and no error or
defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the court or by any
of the parties is ground for granting a new trial or for setting aside a verdict or for
vacating, modifYing, or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to
take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The
court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the
proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties. 6

6
Although the trial court emphasized its great authority over unjust enrichment as a
claim for equitable relief (Tr. Vol. I, p. 557, L. 5 - p. 559, L. 22), significantly it did not grant
Mosell Equities' motion for judgment nov or new trial on this count. In allowing the jury verdict
to stand on u~ust enrichment, the trial court found in essence that the jury's verdict as between
the parties was not inequitable. In other words, the trial court found that the jury's verdict on
u~ust enrichment was not inconsistent with "substantial justice."
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As set forth below, where there was substantial, competent, if controverted, evidence supporting
the jury's verdict on breach of contract, whether the trial court instructed the jury that Exhibit 1
constituted a contract was inconsequential.
One of the key problems with the trial court's analysis in this regard is that it assumed
that they jury found "no contract,,7 (INOV Tr., Vol I, p. 103, L. 24 - p. 104, L. 2), when what
they indicated was quite different. As pointed out at the time by counsel for Berryhill &
Company (Tr., Vol. I, p. 104, Ll. 14-19), the jury was not asked whether Exhibit 1 constituted a
contract in the Special Verdict. Rather, it was asked "was there an express contract between
Plaintiff Mosell Equities, LLC, and Defendant Berryhill & Company, Inc., which was breached?"
(emphasis added) (R., Vol. I, p. 1292, Ll. 14-15). Moreover, the jury was asked to determine the
parties' intent regarding Exhibit 1 as an ambiguous document. Having done so, there was
substantial, competent evidence that no breach occurred, for if the jury concluded, as they easily
could have, that Exhibit 1 did not contemplate a simple loan transaction, there was no breach on
the part of Berryhill & Company for refusing to pay the monies back as if they were a loan.

4.

The jury's special verdict on breach of contract was supported by
substantial, competent evidence.
a.

Both parties, as well as both the district court and the trial court,
treated Exhibit 1 as ambiguous.

As noted above, upon summary judgment the district court found that the alleged express
contract set forth at Exhibit 1 was ambiguous and required factual findings as the parties' intent

7
The trial court went on to state that he was calling all 12 jurors unreasonable for
the first time in 27 years (INOV Tr., Vol. I, p. 104, Ll. 11-13). In this regard, it failed to
recognize that he was only assuming that all 12 jurors did not find a contract, since they were not
asked that precise question.
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CR., Vol. I, p. 755, Ll 8-25). The trial court then gave the jury similar instructions (R., Vol. I, p.
1250,1251,1258,1260, 1261). Even in its Order of Clarification (R., Vol. I., p. 1421,Ll. 17-23)
regarding its original Order Granting Plaintiff s Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the
Verdict (R., Vol. I, pp. 1392-1394), the trial court found that the parties' intent was a factual
determination for a new trial. At the hearing, the trial court stated: "All I'm doing - I said, I'm
setting aside the verdict because, as a matter of law, Exhibit 1 is a contract, a binding contract.
What we don't know is what does it mean?" (JNOV Tr., Vol. I, p. 109, Ll. 7-10). Significantly,
then, even at the JNOV stage the trial judge continued to view Exhibit 1 as ambiguous. 8
For their part, the parties both treated Exhibit 1 as ambiguous requiring evidence of the
parties' intent at the time. Mosell Equities itself noted this in its requested Jury Instruction based
on IDJI 1.41.2 (R., Vol. I, p. 1026, Ll. 10-14). Mosell Equities further requested a special verdict
that placed the interpretation of the ambiguous contract squarely in front of the jury. In its
"Proposed Verdict Form" Plaintiff sought the following question for the jury at #1: " ... did the
parties intend the money Mosell Equities provided, $50,000.00, to be a loan?" At #2, it
requested the following question of the jury: "did the parties intend the money Mosell Equities
provided $50,000.00 to be a loan to remain a loan pending Mosell Equities' "buy-in" of an entity
formed by the parties?" (R., Vol. I, p. 1027, Ll. 1-4).9

Berryhill & Company submits that Exhibit 1 has a "patent" ambiguity in the terms
employed, since "loan" and "buy-in" refer to very different kinds of transactions. See, e.g.,
Knipe Land Co. v. Robertson, _ Idaho _ , 259 P.3d 595, 601 (2011). Whether Exhibit 1 is
deemed to have a patent or latent ambiguity, it was up to the jury to determine the parties' intent.
To the extent that Mosell Equities continues to argue, as it did in its motion for
JNOV, that Exhibit 1 is not really ambiguous at all, but susceptible of only one reasonable
interpretation, it is contradicting its own proffered jury instructions. Accordingly, this Court
should ignore any such argument on the basis of the "invited error" doctrine. See, e.g.,
9
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The jury quite simply found that, in determining the parties' intent, there was no simple
loan transaction intended, which was clearly within their providence to do. If they had found a
loan was intended, they would doubtless have found a breach in answer to Question No. 1 on the
Special Verdict (R., Vol. I, p. 1026, Ll. 20-23) and damages in some amount in answer to
Question No.2. The fact that the jury did not do so indicates that, whether or not they believed a
contract was formed, they found it was not a loan contract.
b.

There was substantial, competent evidence that no loan transaction
was intended.

"[I]f an agreement is ambiguous, the resolution of any ambiguity raises a question of fact
for the trial court or jury." St. Clair v. Krueger, 115 Idaho 702, 704, 760 P.2d 579, 581 (1989),
citing, DeLancey v. DeLancey, 110 Idaho 63, 714 P.2d 32 (1986); Pocatello Ind. Park v. Steel
West, Inc., 101 Idaho 783, 621 P.2d 399 (1980).10 In the very recent case of Idaho Dev., LLC v.
Teton View GolfEstates, LLC, 2011 Ida. LEXIS 183 (Idaho Dec. 12,2011), this Court had the
opportunity to review the standards to be used when, in the similar context of debt
recharacterization, an infusion of funds is to be considered either a loan or equity. This Court
emphasized the proper inquiry is "the true intent of the parties in entering the transaction." And,
"[b]ecause the question of intent is one of fact, the determination as to whether to recharacterize
an advance as a capital contribution or as a loan is an issue of fact." 2011 Ida. LEXIS 183, *16.

Woodburn v. Manco Prods., 137 Idaho 502, 505, 50 P.3d 997, 1000 (2002) ("The purpose of the
invited error doctrine is to prevent a party who caused or played an important role in prompting a
trial court to give or not give an instruction from later challenging that decision on appeal")
(citations omitted).
10
See also, 6-25 Corbin on Contracts § 25.18 ("Since any dispute about
interpretation is ultimately a dispute about the parties' intent, a question of fact, disputed
interpretation should be the province ofthe jury. ").
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The parties intent "may be inferred from what the parties say in their contracts, from what they
do through their actions, and from the economic reality of the surrounding circumstances.
Answers lie in facts that confer context case-by-case." 2011 Ida. LEXIS 183, * 13, quoting, In re

SubMicron Sys. Corp., 432 F.3d 448, 456 (3rd Cir. 2006).
The only question remaining is whether, accepting all of Berryhill & Company's evidence
as true, giving it the benefit of any inferences and ignoring any conflicting evidence from Mosell
Equities, the jury's determination that no loan transaction was intended by the parties was clearly
erroneous. 11
Here, the jury was entitled to believe that the term "loan" came from Mosell, who
explained "we have to call it something" (Tr., Vol. I, p. 523, L. 23). Based on the very language
of Exhibit 1, a "loan" that "will be transitioned" is not a simple loan at all. Further, the parties
were acting as partners in the activities of the restaurant move downtown, they were jointly
signing guarantees of leases and procuring expansion space for both Polo Cove and the restaurant
(Tr., Vol I, p. 885, L. 102; p. 626, L. 12- p. 628, L. 25). The funds at issue were placed on the
books of Berryhill & Company in a "holding pattern," as accountant Amy Dempsey testified,
while the parties attempted to finalize their actual agreement as to the "buy-in" (Tr., Vol. I, p.
796, L.l - P. 797, L. 2). She did not consider the funds to be either a loan or equity, because the
parties, including Mosell, would never clarify the nature of the funds to her (Tr., Vol. I, p. 795,

It is important to note that Mosell Equities brought this action upon the exclusive
theory that the parties intended a loan. At no time in these proceedings has Mosell Equities
asserted a claim for any kind of ownership interest in Defendant Berryhill & Company, Inc.,
whether based on constructive partnership or other potential theory. In fact, Plaintiff has pled
and admitted just the opposite: "However, the parties never formed MOBERRY and Mosell
Equities never acquired its 50% ownership interest in Berryhill & Company" (R., Vol. I, p. 98,
Ll. 8-10.)
11
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Ll. 3-20). Even Mosell said that the categorization of the funds as a "loan" was simply an
"interim substitute." Rather than initially making demand on Berryhill & Company for
repayment of any "loan" amount, Mosell testified that he approached Mr. Berryhill in the
summer of2008 and suggested a deal where Mosell would own fewer shares and get some cash
back (Tr., Vol. I, p. 324, L. 10-12). He also referred to his "investment/divestment in Berryhill
and the lease" (Tr., Vol. I, p. 414, Ll. 10-13) and "my capital contributions" (Tr. Vol. 1., p. 416,
Ll. 4-6). The obvious inference from all of this evidence is that the parties were structuring a
"buy-in," not contemplating a lender-borrower relationship. A unanimous jury so found.

CONCLUSION
For all the foregoing reasons, Berryhill & Company respectfully requests that this Court
vacate the trial court's grant of the motion for JNOV and remand for entry of judgment pursuant
to the jury verdict. Berryhill & Company also requests its costs and attorney fees on this appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED This

g~ of February, 2012.

THOMAS, WILLIAMS & PARK, LLP

Daniel E. Williams
Attorney for Defendants/Appellant
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~Via U.S. Mail
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